Skip to content
By Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer Rob Hagy

Ugarte v. Ugarte: How the Virginia Court of Appeals Weighed Separation, Loans, and Spousal Support

getty-images-OFIu4BmkIEo-unsplash

On March 11, 2025, the Virginia Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Ugarte v. Ugarte, affirming a Fairfax County divorce ruling. The court granted Catherine Ugarte a divorce based on Virginia’s “no fault” statute, which allows divorce after one year of living separate and apart without interruption (Virginia Code § 20-91(A)(9)(a)). In addition, the court awarded her $270,549.50 in equitable distribution, $2,959 per month in permanent spousal support, and $23,780 in attorney’s fees. Eduardo Ugarte had argued that Catherine deserted him, a fault-based ground for divorce, but the trial court rejected that claim, and the appellate court agreed.

This case illustrates how challenging it can be to overturn a trial court’s factual findings. The Virginia Court of Appeals reiterated that factual determinations are reviewed only for abuse of discretion and will not be set aside unless they are plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. In other words, appellate judges generally defer to the trial judge’s credibility assessments. (Payne v. Payne, 77 Va. App. 570 (2023); Hughes v. Hughes, 33 Va. App. 141 (2000); Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255 (2003); Calvin v. Calvin, 31 Va. App. 181 (1999)).

The trial court credited Catherine’s testimony, and her friend’s, that she endured controlling and verbally abusive behavior. It also found she participated in marriage counseling before deciding separation was permanent. In evaluating Eduardo’s desertion claim, the court concluded that Catherine’s separation was justified under the circumstances and therefore did not constitute willful desertion.

A central dispute involved $113,000 Catherine received from her brother. Eduardo claimed these were gifts, but Catherine produced promissory notes showing they were loans. Under Virginia’s equitable distribution statute (Code § 20-107.3(E)), courts must classify property and debts as marital or separate. Here, the judge treated the loans as Catherine’s separate debt and ordered Eduardo to equalize marital assets with a substantial monetary award. This demonstrates how documentation can be decisive. Promissory notes turned what might otherwise have been characterized as family generosity into enforceable debt, shaping the property division outcome.

The court also applied Virginia’s spousal support statute (Code § 20-107.1), which requires judges to consider factors such as each spouse’s income, expenses, and contributions to the marriage. With Eduardo earning more than three times Catherine’s income, the court awarded her nearly $3,000 per month in permanent support. Income disparity is one of the factors courts weigh, and where one spouse earns substantially more than the other and the lower earning spouse demonstrates need, ongoing support may be awarded to balance the financial positions. Catherine also received attorney’s fees, partly because Eduardo represented himself at times and caused unnecessary litigation costs. The court found that his approach prolonged the case and justified shifting fees.

The lessons from Ugarte v. Ugarte are instructive. Participation in counseling can be relevant when defending against fault-based claims like desertion, because it shows the court that separation was not undertaken lightly. Clear documentation of loans or gifts is critical in property division, since courts must classify debts and assets as marital or separate, and the burden of proof rests on the parties. When it comes to spousal support, Virginia law requires judges to weigh many statutory factors. Income disparity can be a significant one, but it is considered alongside need, contributions, and the overall circumstances of the marriage. Finally, because appellate courts rarely disturb a trial judge’s credibility findings, the evidence presented at trial often shapes the outcome of any appeal.